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set of antecedent factors would not be closed to additional mem- 
bers. Its not being closed to them means that antecedent factors 
other than B are possibly relevant to the occurrence of E, whose 
cause is sought. But if even a single additional antecedent factor 
is possibly relevant to E's occurrence, then jointly to assert the 
other premises and to deny the conclusion is not self-contradictory. 
Applying this analysis to Stebbing 's example, we recognize 
that in that example it is known that the only consequent events 
are the two pointer readings on a scale, that the only antecedent 
factors are the weighing of an empty cardboard box and then of 
the same box filled with candy, and that the weighing of the empty 
box causes one of the pointer readings. Because all this is known, 
none of it being merely assumed, the argument is deductive. 
Now, Mill himself wrote of the Method of Residues: 
As one of the forms of the Method of Difference, the Method of Residues 
partakes of its rigorous certainty, provided the previous inductions, those 
which gave the effects of [all but one of the antecedent factors], were ob- 
tained by the same infallible method, and provided we are certain that [one 
particular antecedent] is the only antecedent to which the residual phenome- 
non . . . can be referred; the only agent of which we had not already cal- 
culated and subducted the effect. But . . . we can never be quite certain 
of this (III, viii, 5). 
This passage makes it clear that Mill distinguished between two 
moods of entertaining the proposition that the antecedent factors 
of an allegedly causal sequence are the only antecedent factors. 
Although he distinguished them merely as being certain and as 
not being certain, the context in which he did so indicates that 
what he had in mind was, on the one hand, knowing that the propo- 
sition is true, and, on the other, assuming that it is true. Hence, 
the logic texts are mistaken in stating that Mill's Method of Resi- 
dues is a form of deductive argument.4 
ROBERT HOFFMAN 
Tii CY UNviRsiTY OF NEW YORK 
BROOKLYN COLLEGE 
H. L. A. HART ON JUSTICE 
M Y aim in this note is to discuss Professor Hart's views on 
justice, as embodied in his recent book, The Concept of Law. 
Hart's fellow lawyers, such as myself, are likely to be especially 
'It does not follow that Mill was right in stating that it is inductive. 
Since the method involves no generalization whatever, it would be best, I 
think, to characterize it as being abductive. See Charles Sanders Peirce, 
CoUceted Papers (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1931-1935), 
2.636 and 5.171. 
* Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1961. x, 263 p. 21/. To be reviewed. 
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interested in his views on justice, since he analyzes 'just' and 'un- 
just' as these terms are used in appraisals of laws and the ad- 
ministration of laws. Philosophers, too, should be similarly inter- 
ested, inasmuch as Hart is both a philosopher and a lawyer. 
For Hart, to say that a law is justly administered is to say that 
it is impartially applied to all those and only those who are "alike 
in the relevant respect marked out by the law itself" (156). Thus, 
it is possible for an unjust law to be administered justly; e.g., 
there could be enforcement against all non-whites of a law allowing 
only whites to ride buses. Likewise, it is possible for a just law 
to be administered unjustly; e.g., there could be prosecution of only 
Negro proprietors who violate laws designed to prevent racial 
discrimination in public restaurants. 
Hart says that the laws themselves may be unjust either because 
they do not distribute burdens or benefits fairly or because they 
do not afford compensation for harm done by others. Examples 
of "distributive injustice" might be the failure to allow both 
Negroes and whites to ride buses, the failure to exact taxes ac- 
cording to ability to pay, or the failure to distribute "poor relief" 
according to need. Examples of "compensatory injustice" might 
be the failure to allow compensation for wrongful physical harm, 
for invasions of privacy, or for the value of benefits conferred 
and unjustifiably retained. 
Hart suggests that there is one leading "principle latent 
in . . . (the foregoing) diverse applications of the idea of justice 
(155). His thesis is that "the structure of the idea of justice 
. . .consists of two parts: a uniform or constant feature, sum- 
marized in the precept 'Treat like cases alike (and different cases 
differently) . . . and a shifting or varying criterion used in de- 
termining when, for any given purpose, cases are alike or differ- 
ent" (156). He says, further, that "the criteria of relevant 
resemblances and differences may often vary with the fundamental 
moral outlook of a given person or society" (158). 
The principle 'Treat like cases alike and different cases differ- 
ently' is frequently invoked in assessments of the justice or in- 
justice of the administration of law. Thus we demand that like 
cases be treated alike before the law. Similarly, the principle is 
often invoked in appraisals of the justice or injustice of laws 
distributing burdens and benefits within society. Thus we criti- 
cize laws perpetuating racial discrimination on the basis that these 
laws do not "treat like cases alike." But can the principle be 
invoked to explain the uses of 'just' and 'unjust' in appraisals 
of laws that provide or fail to provide compensation for harm? 
Hart's answer is yes, although he acknowledges that the relation- 
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ship between the principle and compensatory justice is "indirect." 
He argues that when, for example, the moral code forbids the use 
of superior strength for the purpose of harming another, the weak 
are put on an equal footing with the strong. The moral code thus 
creates "among individuals a moral and, in a sense, an artificial 
equality to offset the inequalities of nature" (160). When the 
strong harm the weak and thereby upset this moral equilibrium, 
"justice then requires that this moral status quo should as far 
as possible be restored by the wrongdoer. . . . Thus when laws 
provide compensation where justice demands it, they recognize 
indirectly the principle 'Treat like cases alike' by providing for 
the restoration, after disturbance, of the moral status quo in which 
victim and wrongdoer are on a footing of equality and so alike" 
(161). 
At least, when lawyers invoke the principle 'Treat like cases 
alike', they ordinarily use 'cases' and 'alike' differently from the 
way in which Hart appears to be using these terms in the fore- 
going analysis. For him, the "like cases" appear to be the 
victim's "case" and the wrongdoer's "case." The lawyer ordi- 
narily uses 'case' (in the phrase: 'treat like cases alike') to refer 
to the case that a claimant is "putting" to a court called upon to 
decide whether that case is different from or similar to previously 
decided cases. The wrongdoer in Hart's argument is not "put- 
ting" a case for relief but is instead seeking to avoid liability. 
Likewise, if we say we are treating the wrongdoer's "case" and 
the victim's case "alike" by requiring the former to compensate 
the latter, we also use 'alike' in an extraordinary way. At least, 
most lawyers would consider it linguistically very odd to say of a 
plaintiff recovering damages for harm that he and the defendant 
were being treated "alike." 
However, the foregoing remarks may not be responsive to 
Hart's argument. It may be that he is only attempting to show 
how it is possible to trace some "connection between the justice and 
injustice of . . . compensation for injury, and the principle 'Treat 
like cases alike and different cases differently' " (160). Insofar 
as this is his aim, he appears to be successful. 
The principle 'Treat like cases alike and different cases dif- 
ferently' does not appear to explain another important usage of 
'just' and 'unjust' in the criticism of laws. We frequently say 
that a law is unjust even though it is uniformly applied, i.e., 
even though all cases are treated alike. Thus we say such things 
as: "Our penal code is unjust, for the prescribed punishments 
do not fit the respective crimes," and "This law is unjust because 
it restricts freedom to change jobs." Hart does acknowledge that 
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a "law might be unjust while treating all alike" (160). But then 
he goes on to say that "The vice of such laws would then not be 
the maldistribution, but the refusal to all alike, of compensation 
for injuries which it was morally wrong to inflict on others " 
(160). Should the "vice" of, for example, an irrational scheme 
of punishment or undue restrictions on freedom be described in 
terms of "the refusal to all alike, of compensation for injuries"? 
It seems more appropriate to say, simply, that the vice of such 
laws is that they fail to conform to accepted standards of justice. 
Finally, Hart says that justice is a "distinct segment of moral- 
ity" (153). Usually 'just' and 'unjust' are used as terms of 
moral appraisal, but there appear to be important exceptions to 
this. Thus, for example, if a judge mistakenly applied irrelevant 
law to Jones's case, we should say that this decision was unjust, 
but it is doubtful that we should say that the decision was morally 
wrong. We might, however, say it was morally wrong to let the 
decision stand. 
ROBERT S. SUMMERS 
UNIVERSITY OF OREGON SCHOOL OF LAW 
BOOK REVIEW 
ARTHUR KOESTLER, The Steepwalkers. New York: The Macmillan 
Company, 1959. 624 p. $6.95. 
At the present time, the academic tide is flowing strongly in 
the direction of specialization. The intellectual field is divided up 
into "territories," whose boundaries are watched over jealously. 
But a few subjects resist professionalization and continue to yield 
fruit to the "generalist," the man with a broad and balanced 
background, rather than a more concentrated, narrower one; the 
history of science is a notable example. 
A fully qualified historian of science would be an intellectual 
Hercules. To acquire all the necessary qualifications in one life- 
time is, in fact, humanly impossible. That being so, it still re- 
mains possible for an amateur who has a sufficient sense of pro- 
portion and relevance and who is prepared to go to the original 
sources with an unprejudiced mind to contribute something worth 
while and original to the subject-especially if he has had a sci- 
entific education. Arthur Koestler, who is best known as a politi- 
cal novelist, took up the history of astronoiny with that advantage: 
he was a scientist by training, and started his career as a science 
